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EUCLID AT THREESCORE YEARS AND TEN: IS THIS THE
TWILIGHT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND-USE
REGULATION?
Michael Allan Wolf'
The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and
if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their
strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off; and we fly
away.1
Twilight and evening bell,
And after that the dark!2
To the psalmist the age of seventy marks the end of one's
days on earth, the last days so dimly lit in the poet's eyes. The
calendar reminds us that 1996 marks the seventieth birthday of
one of the most influential and enduring judicial decisions up-
* Professor of Law and History, University of Richmond. The author thanks his
Allen Chair colleagues-Judge Loren Smith, Professor Charles Haar, Professor James
Krier, and Dean William McDonough-for the example they set by their creativity,
energy, and passion about these important issues; and the family and friends of
George E. Allen, whose generosity and support for the life of the mind made this
special opportunity possible and enjoyable.
1. Psalms 90:10 (King James). The Jewish Publication Society translation reads:
The span of our life is seventy years,
or, given the strength, eighty years;
but the best of them are trouble and sorrow.
They pass by speedily, and we are in darkness.
TANAKH: A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE HOLY SCRITuRES ACCORDING TO THE TRADI-
TIONAL HEBREW TEXT 1217 (1985).
2. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Crossing the Bar (1889), reprinted in THE NORTON AN-
THOLOGY OF POETRY, at 716-17 (Alexander W. Allison et al. eds., 3d ed. 1970).
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holding the rights of communities to determine their demo-
graphic, economic, and societal future-Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.3 Case reporters,4 code compilations,5 and
proposed legislation,6 along with treatises' and law review ar-
ticles8 warn us that the broad deference to regulators symbol-
ized by the Euclid text is under attack. The eighth decade of
constitutionally blessed regulation of land use and abuse would
seem to be one of "labor and sorrow" for advocates of tradition-
al planning, zoning, and environmental controls, and with good
reason.
But ten years ago, when I was asked to look back over the
Euclidean landscape from the vantage point of the mid-1980s,
my optimism was apparent (though qualified).9 After chron-
icling the central position Justice George Sutherland's opinion
holds in the pantheon of American jurisprudence, I noted that
"[s]ixty years after the Court's approval of zoning, Euclid en-
dures as substance and symbol, despite waves of demographic,
economic, and political change."'0 More importantly, the words
of Euclid uncannily predicted four leading strands of land-use
challenges in the succeeding six decades, challenges based on
the "exclusion, anticompetitiveness, parochialism, and
aestheticism"" inherent in Euclidean zoning and comprehen-
sive planning.
Despite the potential for destruction contained in these "four
seeds,"' in 1986 there were signs that each was under control.
3. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Fasano v. Board of
County Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
5. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West 1996) (Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private
Property Rights Protection Act).
6. See, e.g., H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (Private Property Protection
Act of 1995).
7. See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS (1996); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW (3d ed. 1993).
8. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, Fruits of the "Impenetrable Jungle": Navigating
the Boundary Between Land-Use Planning and Environmental Law, 50 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Am-
bler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 252 (Charles M.
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court was leading the way in com-
bating the more shameful side of zoning--devices such as large-
lot zones that exclude the poor, aged, and minorities from the
nation's suburbs and exurbs." Federal antitrust law, as broad-
ly interpreted by the Supreme Court, seemed then to have the
potential to chill governmental efforts to steer real estate devel-
opment to favored parties.14 More and more communities were
talking about accepting responsibility for their fair share of
affordable housing for the metropolitan region, and even begin-
ning serious discussions about lightening the financial and
social services burdens of the central city. 5 Finally, the per-
ceived arbitrariness and unbridled subjectivity of aesthetic regu-
lation was meeting its match in carefully designed, expert-based
and -endorsed, historic and architectural preservation
schemes. 6
The future looked relatively bright, despite the naysayers
from the antiregulatory'7 and metaregulatory 8 extremes, in
large part because
three intrinsic elements [of Euclid] have withstood the chal-
lenges of time, theory, and practice. First, the Court pre-
scribed a flexible approach in the legislative implementation
and judicial review of public land use planning devices.
Second, the Court endorsed careful, expert-based planning,
eschewing the haphazard vagaries of the market. Third, the
Court approved the transfer, from individual to collective
ownership, of development rights above a level often labeled
13. See id. at 259, 269 (discussing Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.) (Mount Laurel 1), app. dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel 11)).
14. See id. at 260, 269-70 (discussing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
455 U.S. 40 (1982)).
15. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 85-119 (1993) ("strategies for
Stretching Cities"). See also Wolf, supra note 9, at 270.
16. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 270 (discussing improvements in preservation prac-
tices).
17. See id. at 267 (discussing the work of Bernard Siegan, "[tihe champion of
nonzoning").
18. See id. at 268 (discussing FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971)).
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"reasonable return." These three elements have remained
inviolate, despite years of experimentation and variation.19
Ten years ago, I concluded this demi-homage thus: "What one
sees, despite some original imperfections and repeated abuses,
is a process of synthesis and experimentation that deserves a
hard look, a bit of respect, and perhaps some celebration de-
spite the wolves and pallbearers at the door."" What then
seemed bright today appears dim, what then seemed inviolate
today appears vulnerable. This article seeks to explore the
changes-affirmative acts, missteps, and omissions-that war-
rant such a guarded diagnosis. Only when we appreciate the
nature and extent of this declension, can we begin to discuss
seriously prospects and strategies for repair or replacement.
Part I of this article revisits the jurisprudential landscape of
the mid-1980s, when jurists in several settings endorsed a flexi-
ble, incentive-based approach to the regulation of land use. Part
II addresses more recent developments in Euclid's four problem
areas-exclusion, anticompetitiveness, parochialism, and
aestheticism-and argues that in each case the progress of the
1980s has been stifled or even reversed. Part III argues that
the "three intrinsic elements" of Euclid are anything but sacro-
sanct today, given the growing number of legislative and judi-
cial initiatives designed to smother, stifle, or make cost-prohibi-
tive, environmental and land-use regulatory schemes. In the
concluding section, Part IV, the article turns to the work of four
leading figures in the land-use and environmental are-
nas--Judge Loren Smith, Professors Charles Haar and James
Krier, and Dean William McDonough-for guidance in reconcil-
ing ourselves to, learning the most constructive lessons from,
and shaping, our post-Euclidean world.
I. A PROMISING START: JUDICIAL SUPPORT FOR
FLEXIBLE REGULATION
The 1980s were years of great promise for supporters of en-
lightened and flexible land-use and environmental controls.
19. Id. at 269.
20. Id. at 271.
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Local, state, and federal officials, spurred on, or assisted by,
activist judges, were confronting for the first time some key
trouble spots of American planning and zoning practice. Not all
of these initiatives were universally acclaimed; nor were they
without flaws. Still, it appeared that the new leitmotif of land-
use and environmental regulation was responsiveness-to the
needs of the greater society and to the realities of the real
estate development market.
In the 1970s and 1980s, as-of-right zoning and command-and-
control environmental constraints were giving way to incentive
schemes designed to stimulate economically efficient and social-
ly responsible private-sector activities.2 A number of courts
endorsed and abetted these shifts, ignoring or distinguishing
away potentially troublesome common- and constitutional-law
dicta. Four cases typify this judicial endorsement of regulatory
flexibility-Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of
New York,22 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources De-
fense Council,' In re Egg Harbor Associates,' and Collard v.
Incorporated Village of Flower Hill."
A. Preservation in the Balance
When the United States Supreme Court, in Penn Central,
refused to invalidate the designation of Grand Central Terminal
as a landmark under New York City's Landmarks Preservation
Law, the national preservation movement was in full swing.
The holding gave even greater encouragement to efforts to add
historic preservation to the legal canon. According to Professor
Costonis,
By the time the nation's bicentennial rolled around in 1976,
preservation's ranks had ballooned. The movement shed its
antiquarian image by building bridges to powerful allies in
political, financial, and ethnic circles. And by 1988 more
21. See, e.g., Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Compar-
ative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv 565 (1992).
22. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
23. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. 464 A.2d 1115 (N.J. 1983).
25. 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981).
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than 1,000 cities had adopted landmark and historic district
regulations.2"
With relative ease, the Penn Central majority hurdled three
traditional legal barriers faced by preservationists and their law
and planning allies who developed and employed flexible devic-
es such as transferable development rights to mollify owners of
landmark structures." First, the Court, building on dictum
planted in Berman v. Parker" (an unsuccessful challenge to
urban renewal), bypassed decades of land-use precedent that
had cautioned regulators that aesthetics alone would not suffice
as the basis for police power regulation." Indeed, the problem-
atic nature of aesthetic-based regulation was not even an issue
26. JOHN J. COSTONIS, IcoNs AND ALIENS 24 (1989).
27. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137:
[T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build above the
Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they have been denied
all use of even those pre-existing air rights. Their ability to use these
rights has not been abrogated; they are made transferable to at least
eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of which have
been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings. Although
appellants and others have argued that New York City's transferable
development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York courts here
supportably found that, at least in the case of the Terminal, the rights
afforded are valuable.
The classic work on TDRs is John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Ex-
ploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973).
28. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Speaking for the Court, Justice William 0. Douglas noted:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
Id. at 33 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting
Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 1905):
It is probable that the enactment of section 1 of the [sign and billboard]
ordinance was due rather to aesthetic considerations than to consider-
ations of the public safety. No case has been cited, nor are we aware of
any case which holds that a man may be deprived of his property be-
cause his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic considerations
are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take
private property without compensation.
See also Jesse J. Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 218 (1955). But cf John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its
Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1252, 1296 (1996) ("colo-
nial legislatures sometimes regulated land use for expressly aesthetic purposes").
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in the case, as "appellants do not contest that New York City's
objective of preserving structures and areas with special his-
toric, architectural, or cultural significance is an entirely per-
missible governmental goal.""0
The second potential barrier-the claim that the city's preser-
vation scheme lacked the essential comprehensiveness of legiti-
mate land-use regulatory devices-was summarily rejected by
the Penn Central majority. The Court denied that this was a
case of "discriminatory, or 'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-
use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for
different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring
ones."3' Despite claims by landowners that they were being
asked to shoulder special burdens for the benefit of the common
weal, the Justices were willing to allow New York and other
localities to experiment with unorthodox, incentive-driven sys-
tems for preserving architecturally, historically, or culturally
significant structures and districts.
The third barrier-the allegation that the city had in effect
"taken" the appellants' property by designating it a land-
mark-proved a bit more challenging for the Penn Central
Court. After all, for more than five decades the Court, heeding
Justice Holmes's caveat, had understood that regulation that
goes "too far .. will be recognized as a taking."32 Moreover,
the city's refusal to allow Penn Central's tenant to use the air
rights above Grand Central Terminal seemed inconsistent with
the Court's holding in United States v. Causby,"3 involving a
takings lawsuit brought for "frequent and regular flights of
army and navy aircraft over respondents' land at low alti-
tudes." The majority in Causby deemed it "obvious that if the
landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have
exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
30. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129.
31. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132. Cf. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., 'Spot Zon-
ing"-A Spot That Could Be Removed From the Law, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 117, 123 (1995) ("this Article argues that courts should abandon the
term 'spot zoning' in favor of general principles of zoning law").
32. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
33. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
34. Id. at 258.
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atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected, trees
could not be planted, and even fences could not be run."35
The Penn Central Court was undeterred, distinguishing these
and other precedents that suggested the city had exceeded its
powers under the Constitution. Most importantly, the majority,
engaging in the relativistic balancing that typifies twentieth-
century constitutional law decision-making," introduced a mul-
ti-factor, "ad hoc" test for determining whether specific regula-
tions amount to takings:
[T]he Court's decisions have identified several factors that
have particular significance. The economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant consider-
ations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
A "taking" may more readily be found when the interfer-
ence with property can be characterized as a physical inva-
sion by government than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.37
This was a far cry from the formalistic characterization of gov-
ernmental activity as an infringement on private property
rights in earlier cases such as Pumpelly v. Green Bay Compa-
ny3 8 and United States v. Lynah.9 Indeed, short of a com-
pelled permanent physical occupation of private land by the
government or its agents,0 or of the unlikely event that gov-
ernment action totally devalued a landowner's entire parcel,41
35. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
36. See MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 28-29 (1992); Michael Allan Wolf, Takings Term II.
New Tools for Attacking and Defending Environmental and Land-Use Regulation, 13
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 469, 513-15 (1993).
37. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
38. 80 U.S. 166 (1872) (construction of dam, pursuant to state authority, that
flooded private property constituted taking).
39. 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (as a result of navigation improvement, rice plantation
turned into valueless bog, constituting taking).
40. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
41. The Penn Central Court focused "both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole-here,
the city tax block designated as the landmark site.'" Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
For a total-taking case, see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
[Vol. 30:961
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the Penn Central test would prove to be a significant shield and
impetus for innovative land-use regulators who, during the
succeeding ten years, moved beyond Euclidean zoning's "as-of-
right" rigidity.
B. Offsetting the Hard Look
Eight years after Penn Central, the Supreme Court again
deferred to regulators-this time officials in the Environmental
Protection Agency. In Chevron,2 the Justices rejected the Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council's challenge to EPA's flexible
interpretation of the term "stationary source," as that phrase
appears in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.4" NRDC
and other environmentalists were troubled by the agency's use
of the "bubble concept," whereby, in nonattainment areas for
criteria pollutants, "an existing plant that contains several
pollution-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of
equipment without meeting the [otherwise stringent] permit
conditions if the alteration will not increase the total emissions
from the plant.""
The two potential barriers faced by the governmental and
regulated industry litigants were Court precedents suggesting
that serious judicial scrutiny was in order ' and an inconclu-
sive legislative history.46 As in Penn Central, however, the
Court was unflinching, sending a strong signal to federal judges
that deference was the preferred position in case involving
flexible regulation."' The bubble concept endorsed by the EPA
(1992).
42. Chevron U.SA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
43. Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3)(1996)).
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
45. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 91-92 (2d ed. 1994) (foot-
note omitted) ("The 1971 decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
[401 U.S. 402 (1971)] is the most frequently cited decision in the history of environ-
mental law. In that case the Supreme Court made clear that courts reviewing agency
actions affecting environmental values must be aggressive overseers.").
46. The Chevron Court concluded that, "[biased on our examination of the leg-
islative history, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is unilluminating." Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 862.
47. According to Professor Rodgers, that signal has been received quite clearly:
"Chevron has proven to be among the most frequently cited decisions in the history of
1996] 969
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
had something essential in common with the transferable devel-
opment rights that buttressed New York City's landmark pres-
ervation scheme: In each case, the regulators (and the approv-
ing Court) refused to narrow the focus of their analysis, consid-
ering the "parcel as a whole" (rather than the air rights above
Grand Central Terminal) and "all of the pollution-emitting
devices within the same industrial grouping"' (rather than
"each unit within a plant"").
The Chevron Court's judicial review formula has become as
familiar to American jurists and commentators as the Penn
Central balancing test:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two ques-
tions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the in-
tent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute."0
The Chevron Court, left without sufficient legislative guidance,
opted not to "reconcile competing political interests . . . on the
basis of the judges' personal policy preferences."5'
administrative law so that it stands as a close rival to Overton Park. Empirical stud-
ies have shown that the decision has resulted in greater deference in the lower feder-
al courts even while the decision is unevenly applied by the Supreme Court itself."
Rodgers, supra note 46, at 97-98 (footnotes omitted).
48. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
49. Id. at 859.
50. Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
51. Id. at 865.
[Vol. 30:961
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C. Setting Aside Exclusiveness
In the summer of 1983, as they surveyed the realm of state
planning and zoning law, members of the New Jersey Supreme
Court could take pride in the leadership role that they and
their most recent predecessors had assumed. Eight years before,
in Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel ),52 the court responded to the discriminatory
and parochial use of land-use controls by local governments in
"developing communities" across the Garden State, fastening
upon each such locality a legal obligation to provide "its fair
share of the regional burden" for low and moderate income
housing.53 A single warning, however, was not enough for
many recalcitrant communities; so, in January, 1983, the court
reiterated and strengthened its position in Mount Laurel II:5
This Court is more firmly committed to the original Mount
Laurel doctrine than ever, and we are determined, within
appropriate judicial bounds, to make it work. The obligation
is to provide a realistic opportunity for housing, not litiga-
tion. We have learned from experience, however, that unless
a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result
in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and
appeals. We intend by this decision to strengthen it, clarify
it, and make it easier for public officials, including judges,
to apply it.'
The supreme court was not alone, however, in its campaign for
increasing the state's supply of affordable housing.
In 1979, Egg Harbor Associates sought a Department of En-
vironmental Protection (DEP) permit for the construction of
Bayshore Centre, "a residential community of 1,530 units, a
500-room hotel, a 300-slip marina, a 22-story office building,
and 4,200 parking spaces" in Egg Harbor Township, close to At-
lantic City.5" The extensive project was approved, though sub-
52. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
53. Id. at 733-34.
54. Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983).
55. Id. at 410.
56. In re Egg Harbor Assoc., 464 A-2d 1115, 1117 (N.J. 1983).
1996] 971
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ject to the condition that ten percent of the proposed residences
be set aside for low-income housing and ten percent for moder-
ate-income housing.57 Displeased with the conditional permit,
the developer challenged DEP, claiming that the agency's "ac-
tions were based on an impermissibly vague delegation of legis-
lative power and that forcing a developer to build low and mod-
erate income housing is an unconstitutional taking of property
without compensation.""
The state supreme court rejected the first challenge, noting
that the goals of the Coastal Area Facility Review Act
(CAFRA)59 (in accordance with which DEP officials acted in
conditioning their approval on the provision of affordable hous-
ing) were quite broad: "Although CAFRA is principally an envi-
ronmental protection statute, the powers delegated to DEP
extend well beyond protection of the natural environment. Suc-
cinctly stated, the delegated powers require DEP to regulate
land use within the coastal zone for the general welfare."" In
accordance with those goals, DEP cited in support of its condi-
tional permit the "'unquestioned need [that] exists in the At-
lantic City regions for housing for low and moderate income
households, as a direct result of casino development."''
Given this and other evidence by the agency of the intercon-
nectedness of economic development, housing, and environmen-
tal protection, it was easy for the court to conclude that the
term "general welfare" encompassed housing needs as well as
environmental protection. The developer's plea for the justices
to narrow their focus was, for good reason, denied: "To hold ...
that CAFRA can consider only the environment, but not the
needs of the people who live in it, is contrary to the legislative
intent.... Environmental protection, like good zoning, is not
an exercise in abstract analysis, but in the pragmatics of re-
sponsible and sensitive land use control."62 The Egg Harbor
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:19-1 to -21 (West 1991).
60. Egg Harbor, 464 A.2d at 1118.
61. Id. at 1120 (quoting DEP, Division of Coastal Resources Opinion #73, at 21
(August, 1980)).
62. Id. at 1122.
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court rightfully considered the proposed project in its physical
and socioeconomic context, not as an island unto itself.
The justices resolved the takings challenge with even greater
dispatch. The court first noted that the plaintiff shouldered the
"burden of demonstrating that a taking has occurred" and that
the "[p]roof must be by clear and convincing evidence."63 Be-
cause there was no proof offered that, with the conditional
permit, Bayshore Centre "will not return a profit or will return
a profit so low as to amount to a taking," the court would not
assume that an unconstitutional deprivation had taken place."
The justices closed their takings analysis by quoting their re-
cent Mount Laurel II opinion: "As for confiscation, the builder
who undertakes a project that includes a mandatory set-aside
voluntarily assumes the financial burden, if there is any, of
that condition."'65 As did the Penn Central and Chevron courts,
the Egg Harbor court widened its focus to include the entire
project and refused to heighten its scrutiny in the absence of
solid proof of confiscatory or arbitrary regulation.
D. Conditional Approval
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed some considerable tampering
with the simple Euclidean scheme of height, area, and use
regulation. "Post-Euclidean"" devices abounded, including, but
not limited to, incentive,67 noncumulative,68 and mixed-use
zoning; 9 performance standards;" and planned unit develop-
ment.7 These new devices shared two fundamental character-
istics: they significantly departed from the as-of-right, uniformi-
63. Id. at 1123.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 390).
66. See CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING 255-88
(4th ed. 1989) ("Post-Euclidean Modifications of the Zoning Ordinance").
67. See, e.g., id. at 256-69.
68. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 7, at 178-80.
69. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 66, at 283-84.
70. See, e.g., id. at 276-79; LANE KENDiG, PERFORMANCE ZONING (1980); Luther L.
McDougal, III, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47
TUL. L. REV. 255 (1973); Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE
DAtEE L. REV. 363 (1991).
71. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 66, at 279-83; MANDELKER, supra note 7,
at 425-33.
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ty of first-generation zoning, and they were responsive to the
landowner who could demonstrate that a development, though
technically in violation of one aspect of the Euclidean scheme,
was in keeping with the goals and spirit of sound comprehen-
sive planning. The developer who, for example, wished to in-
clude single-family detached houses and multi-family dwellings
in the same neighborhood-thereby violating the Euclidean
tenet of separation of uses-could do so if the local government
allowed planned unit development and if density limits were
not exceeded.
The post-Euclidean device that perhaps best demonstrates
this flexibility and responsiveness is conditional rezoning,
whereby a landowner, typically in an effort to secure a change
to a more intensive (and more lucrative) use, agrees to impose
on the land unilaterally certain limitations that would not be
imposed on land rezoned in a more "orthodox" fashion. 2 Col-
lard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill,7" a 1981 opinion by
the New York Court of Appeals, signaled a growing acceptance
of this practice, a practice that departs from the predominant
as-of-right nature of Euclidean zoning in which the zoning ordi-
nance typically contains a complete and uniform description of
the activities and structures permitted in a discrete zone.
The plaintiffs' predecessors in title had in 1964 secured a
zoning change to enable them to build a private sanitarium in
a district that had been designated for single-family dwell-
ings.74 A declaration of covenants was recorded concurrently
with the rezoning, whereby the landowners assured the munici-
pality that, despite the reclassification to General Municipal
and Public Purposes District, the parcel would only be used for
a sanitarium." Twelve years later, as the "sanitarium had fall-
en into disuse,"76 the same landowners secured a second rezon-
ing, this time to a Business District classification; a second set
of covenants was filed as well, by which the landowners bound
72. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 7, at 287-89.
73. 421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981).
74. See id. at 819 n.1.
75. See id. at 819.
76. Id. at 819 n.1.
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themselves and their successors to restrictions not otherwise
applicable to land zoned for business.
7
Included among the second set of covenants was a promise
that ".No building or structure situated on the Subject Premis-
es ... will be altered, extended, rebuilt, renovated or enlarged
without the prior consent of the Board of Trustees of the Vil-
lage.' 78 That promise spelled trouble for the plaintiffs, who
purchased the sanitarium property two years after the second
rezoning, because it frustrated their plans "to enlarge and ex-
tend the existing structure on the premises."79 They pursued
their allegation that the village's insistence that the plaintiffs
adhere to this promise constituted "arbitrary, capricious, unrea-
sonable, and unconstitutional"" behavior all the way to the
New York Court of Appeals.
Judge Jones and his colleagues were not sympathetic to the
plaintiffs' plight, despite two long-standing objections to condi-
tional rezoning. To the charge that this post-Euclidean practice
constitutes spot zoning, Jones noted that the evil inherent in
spot zoning-typically a small-parcel rezoning to a more inten-
sive use, over the objections of neighboring landowners -- was
not present in cases such as the one before the court. Plaintiffs'
grantors had agreed to the "imposition of greater restrictions on
land use," thereby "benefiting surrounding properties."82 If an
unconditional rezoning would have been proper, "then a fortiori
conditions imposed by a local legislature to minimize conflicts
among districts should not in and of themselves violate any
prohibition against spot zoning."'
The court also overcame the second traditional objec-
tion-that conditional rezoning "constitutes an illegal bargaining
away of a local government's police power."" The judges of-
77. See id.
78. Id. at 820 (alteration in original) (quoting Declaration of Covenants).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Professor Mandelker notes: "A 'spot zoning' is a zoning map amendment that
rezones a tract of land from a less intensive to a more intensive use district. Spot
zoning comes under attack because objectors believe it confers a 'zoning favor' on a
single landowner without justification." MANDELKER, supra note 7, at 248.
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fered this realistic endorsement of the kind of flexible land-use
regulation that is responsive to developers' and surrounding
landowners' needs:
While permitting citizens to be governed by the best bar-
gain they can strike with a local legislature would not be
consonant with notions of good government, absent proof of
a contract purporting to bind the local legislature in ad-
vance to exercise its zoning authority in a bargained-for
manner, a rule which would have the effect of forbidding a
municipality from trying to protect landowners in the vicini-
ty of a zoning change by imposing protective conditions
based on the assertion that that body is bargaining away
its discretion, would not be in the best interests of the
public.'
In Collard, as in Penn Central, Chevron, Egg Harbor, and nu-
merous other challenges in the 1970s and early 1980s to inno-
vative land-use and environmental regulations, the judiciary,
assured that adequate protections against arbitrary and confis-
catory governmental behavior remained in place, assumed a
solicitous posture. Just a few years later, however, in cases in
which the regulatory tools at issue furthered the negative lega-
cy of Euclidean zoning, that posture unfortunately proved lack-
ing.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH DEFERENCE: SOWING THE SEEDS
OF EUCLID
Ten years ago, it struck me that, in the Euclid opinion, "the
Court's words and phrases anticipate four principal 'modern'
objections to Euclidean zoning and comprehensive governmental
land use regulation."86 I labeled those objections--exclusion,
anticompetitiveness, parochialism, and aestheticism-the "four
seeds" planted in Euclid, and traced the development of each
negative aspect as planning and zoning burgeoned and
matured."
85. Id. at 821-22.
86. Wolf, supra note 9, at 253.
87. See id. at 253-64.
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Still, in keeping with the optimism that permeates my earlier
work, I highlighted the ways in which courts and legislatures
were addressing the underside of land-use regulation. In 1975,
after decades of ignoring or even abetting exclusionary zoning
practices, the members of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Mount Laurel I "recognized and attacked the link between land
use restrictions and socioeconomic segregation."88 "During the
subsequent decade," I noted with admiration, "the legacy of
Mount Laurel has been impressive: some corrective legislation,
replication in a handful of state courts, oceans of ink in
planning and law journals, and stubborn resistance leading to a
second (more restrictive and demanding) supreme court decision
in New Jersey."89
A decade ago the battle against the anticompetitive aspects of
zoning was proceeding apace as well. Despite the shield Con-
gress provided in the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984," it appeared then that, "with injunctive relief and attor-
neys fees still available, the antitrust count remains an effec-
tive component of the litigation package for the late-1980s land
use attorney representing disgruntled private interests."9' The
parochial nature of land-use planning and zoning were under
attack in the 1980s, too, and I noted then that, "[blecause of
zoning's contribution to the continued isolation of middle-class
communities, courts and legislatures in some states have man-
dated regional responsibility for suburban areas, while in other
areas planning and zoning controls have been recaptured by
state officials."92
Finally, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed dramatic experimen-
tation with aesthetic-based controls, ranging from historic93
and open-space94 preservation, to subdivision exactions for rec-
88. Id. at 259.
89. Id. (footnotes omitted).
90. Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36
(1996).
91. Wolf, supra note 9, at 260.
92. Id. at 262.
93. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
94. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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reational purposes,95 and schemes for controlling adult uses."
Courts, and this commentator, looked approvingly at these and
other efforts to create balanced, well-designed communities, for
it appeared that there were protections in place to check the
subjectivity that had plagued earlier aesthetic controls.
With the benefit of the perfect vision that hindsight accords,
it appears now that such optimism was misplaced. There have
been some recent advances in the struggle to make land-use
regulation more efficient and equitable.97 Nonetheless, the last
ten years have produced too many examples of governmental
miscues in all four areas-excesses in some instances, shortcom-
ings in others-to warrant a wholly sanguine outlook regarding
the future of land-use regulation, unless some adjustments and
corrections are instituted.
The struggle against exclusionary zoning has slowed consider-
ably over the past decade, despite the best efforts of judges and
legislators in New Jersey and elsewhere. In the Garden State,
state legislators responded to the strong mandate of Mount
Laurel II with a Fair Housing Act98 that neutralized some of
the judicially imposed remedies and provided a way for suburbs
to opt out of their regional obligation. Although it was hard to
deny that the legislation was a retrenchment from the steps
taken by the court, the justices acceded to state lawmakers'
wishes that an administrative agency-the Council on Afford-
able Housing (COAH)-take the lead in the fight to achieve an
adequate supply of affordable housing.9
The justices' strong endorsement of inclusionary zoning
devices in Egg Harbor was also targeted by the New Jersey
Legislature. Professor Haar offers this somber appraisal:
[A] majority of the legislature cut down the court's construc-
tion of CAFRA by passing a statute expressly preventing
the DEP from demanding "the provision of low and moder-
95. See, e.g., MANDELKER, supra note 7, at 418-21.
96. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
97. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is
Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555 (1993).
98. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 1986).
99. See Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986) (Mount
Laurel III).
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ate income housing as a condition" for a permit. More than
one-third of the state once again became exempt from meet-
ing any obligation to the poor. Although border disputes
among the branches of government raise few eyebrows to-
day, the mind reels at the speed with which the legislature
repudiated the supreme court ruling in Egg Harbor."'
In the past decade, only one additional state supreme
court-New Hampshire's-has endorsed the Mount Laurel no-
tion of regional general welfare.' 0' Other courts, most notably
the New York Court of Appeals in Asian Americans for Equali-
ty v. Koch, 2 have refused to interpret the notion of general
welfare to be as capacious and demanding as did their counter-
parts in New Jersey. While a few states have addressed the
acute shortages of affordable housing, particularly in suburbs
outside of the nation's urban centers, through legislation autho-
rizing devices such as set-asides and density bonuses,0 3
inclusionary schemes have realized only marginal success.'
Moreover, the various efforts to link affordable housing produc-
tion to new office and commercial development raise serious
takings concerns in the light of the "rough proportionality"
standard used by the Supreme Court in Dolan.'°
On the anticompetitive front, since the mid-1980s the Su-
preme Court has made it more difficult for property owners to
prevail in antitrust actions against local governments and their
officials. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,"6 the Court
refused to reverse the dismissal of a Sherman Act claim
brought against a city that conditioned the provision of sewage
treatment on an agreement by private property owners to allow
the city to annex their homes."' The Justices concluded that
Eau Claire's actions "were taken pursuant to a clearly articulat-
ed state policy to replace competition in the provision of sewage
100. CHARLES HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES
92 (1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:19-11.1 (West 1991)).
101. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991).
102. 527 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988).
103. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 65915 (1983) (providing density bonuses to de-
velopers building minimum number of affordable housing units).
104. See HAAR, supra note 100, at 189-92.
105. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
106. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
107. See id. at 37.
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services with regulation,"' although the state legislature did
not "expressly state in a statute or its legislative history that
the legislature intends for the delegated action to have
anticompetitive effects."' 9 Moreover, the Court held "that ac-
tive state supervision is not a prerequisite to exemption from
the antitrust laws where the actor is a municipality rather than
a private party."110
The next year, 1986, brought further solace for local govern-
ments who faced antitrust challenges to their alleged market
tampering. In Fisher v. City of Berkeley,"' the Court rejected
a challenge to the city's stringent rent control ordinance that
imposed rent ceilings administered by a Rent Stabilization
Board." Justice Marshall deemed the program "a restraint
imposed unilaterally by government," not an illegal conspiracy
or concerted action, and noted that "[tihe owners of residential
property in Berkeley have no more freedom to resist the city's
rent controls than they do to violate any other local ordinance
enforced by substantial sanctions.""' Justice Brennan, whose
opinion for the Court in Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder"4 invigorated municipal antitrust law, was
frustrated by what he perceived to be the majority's retreat."'
In its most recent offering in the area, the Court distanced
itself even further from the activism of the early 1980s. In City
of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,"6 the Court
declined to recognize a conspiracy exception to state (and state-
authorized municipal) immunity from federal antitrust sanc-
tions. Omni, a Georgia corporation, alleged that the city had
108. Id. at 47.
109. Id. at 43.
110. Id. at 47.
111. 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
112. See id. at 262-63.
113. Id. at 267.
114. 455 U.S. 40 (1981).
115. See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Ultimately, the Court is holding that a municipality's authority to
protect the public welfare should not be constrained by the Sherman Act.
That holding excludes a broad range of local government anticompetitive
activities from the reach of the antitrust laws. This flies in the face of
the fact that Congress has not enacted such a broad antitrust exemption
for municipalities.
116. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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improperly colluded with a local competitor that controlled a
ninety-five percent market share and that the result was tight
restrictions on billboard construction."7 The Court was unsym-
pathetic: "The fact is that viftually all regulation benefits some
segments of the society and harms others; and that it is not
universally considered contrary to the public good if the net
economic loss to the losers exceeds the net economic gain to the
winners."" Combined with Town of Hallie's expansive version
of state authorization and Fisher's refusal to tamper with uni-
lateral controls, Omni sent a strong signal that local land-use
regulators who engaged in arguably anticompetitive activities
were no longer pursuing a high-risk activity.
In the 1980s, there was great hope that, with the growing
popularity of regional and statewide planning,"' parochialism
was at last on the wane. The Euclid opinion itself had estab-
lished the principle of self-determination for local governments,
at least in the area of land-use regulation, when it declared
that the Village of Euclid, "though physically a suburb of Cleve-
land, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its
own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the
limits of the organic law of its creation and the state and feder-
al Constitutions."" Yet, often ignored is Justice Sutherland's
caveat concerning the limits of localism: "It is not meant by
this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to
stand in the way."' In fact, a search of computer law data-
bases reveals only one reported appellate opinion over the last
decade in which a court quoted the Euclid caveat. Not surpris-
ingly, the quotation appears in the only state supreme court
117. See id. at 367-68.
118. Id. at 377.
119. See, e.g., JOHN M. DEGROVE, THE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PLANNING
AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES (1992); David L. Callies, The Quiet Rev-
olution Revisited. A Quarter Century of Progress, 26 URB. LAW. 197 (1994); James H.
Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for
State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (1994); Note, State-
Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1127 (1995) (hereinafter State-Sponsored Growth Management).
120. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
121. Id. at 390.
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decision that adopts the expansive view of regional obligation
found in Mount Laurel II-Britton v. Town of Chester.2
There are other telling signs that parochialism is alive and
thriving in the area of land-use regulation. First, growth control
ordinances continue to attract the attention of local government
officials because, depending on one's outlook, they either pro-
vide "communities time to develop comprehensive growth plans,
for relieving pollution and smog, and for helping to preserve the
'quality of life,'"' or serve as "as a self-interested, elitist ef-
fort to increase property values and fence out newcomers. " '
The likelihood that the second motivation is a significant factor
increases when the no- or slow-growth scheme is effected
through "ballot-box zoning," referenda and initiatives that "pro-
vide[ I local citizens with a means of addressing the growth and
development-related problems they feel their local planning
officials are either unable or unwilling to remedy."'
Second, despite the growing number of critics who decry
suburban sprawl and the increasing isolation and impoverish-
122. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A-2d 492, 495 (N.H. 1991).
123. Keith R. Denny, Note, That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Control and the
Federal Constitution, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (1990).
124. Id. For a more optimistic view of the potential of growth management to
redress exclusionary zoning, see State-Sponsored Growth Management, supra note 119,
at 1137 (footnotes omitted):
Growth management has not received unanimous support from
commentators. Some commentators argue that any regulations imposed to
meet environmental and infrastructure needs will increase the cost of
housing construction. Other commentators are wary because the conceptu-
al framework for growth management originated in local "growth control"
or "slow growth" ordinances, through which localities attempted to limit
development. Although local growth controls sometimes reflect genuine
concern for the natural environment, they often serve as pretexts for the
exclusion of low-income residents. Unlike local growth control ordinances,
however, state-sponsored growth management responds to state rather
than local interests and thus avoids NIMBYism and attempted cost shift-
ing among localities.
125. David G. Andersen, Urban Blight Meets Municipal Manifest Destiny: Zoning at
the Ballot Box, the Regional Welfare, and Transferable Development Rights, Comment,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 519, 520 (1991). See also id. at 547-48 (use of ballot-box zoning to
advance parochial interests); Derrick Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978); David L. Callies et al., Ballot Box Zon-
ing: Initiative, Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53, 94-
95 (1991) (noting discriminatory potential of referendum and initiative).
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ment of the inner city," new, self-governed, Edge Cities are
proliferating throughout the country:
Our new city centers are tied together not by locomotives
and subways, but by jetways, freeways, and rooftop satellite
dishes thirty feet across. Their characteristic monument is
not a horse-mounted hero, but the atria reaching for the
sun and shielding trees perpetually in leaf at the cores of
corporate headquarters, fitness centers, and shopping pla-
zas. These new urban areas are marked not by the pent-
houses of the old urban rich or the tenements of the old
urban poor. Instead, their landmark structure is the cele-
brated single-family detached dwelling, the suburban home
with grass all around that made America the best-housed
civilization the world has ever known. 7
There are no significant disincentives-legal, economic, or so-
cial-to the increased popularity of these beltway behemoths
that grow at the expense of, not in concert with, the older urban
centers in the region. Indeed, as Professor Eisen notes, "[f]or
better or worse, Edge Cities are precursors to the postmodern
urban future."'
Third, as noted previously, 9 the New Jersey mandate that
individual localities have regional obligations has spawned too
few imitations. Moreover, even in the Garden State, the Fair
Housing Act allows suburban communities to opt out of up to
half of their regional fair share of affordable housing through
regional cooperation agreements.3 0 In providing this avenue of
126. See, e.g., PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLiS: ECOLOGY,
COmmUNITY, AND THE AMERICAN DREAi 9 (1993): "[B]oth the city and suburb are now
locked in a mutually negating evolution toward loss of community, human scale, and
nature. In practical terms, these patterns of growth have created on one side conges-
tion, pollution, and isolation, and on the other urban disinvestment and economic
hardship."
127. JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 4 (1988).
128. Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from Federal Regula-
tion of Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 31 (1995).
129. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
130. According to Professor Payne,
Under these Agreements, "sending" municipalities, invariably in the sub-
urbs, can contract with "receiving" municipalities, invariably poorer and
more urbanized, for the former to fund up to half of its fair share obliga-
tion through construction or rehabilitation of housing in the latter. The
most recent COAH summary shows a total of thirty-nine Regional Contri-
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"cooperation," state lawmakers enable the continuation of the
notion that cities and their suburbs are "separate kingdoms"
whose destinies are distinct, if not de facto, then at least de
jure.
Finally, over the last decade, despite a great deal of rhetoric
and numerous supporting studies,'' there have been no sig-
nificant steps taken toward effective and widespread regional
planning and governance. The most prominent advocate for
reconceptualizing the American city, David Rusk, notes that
"[r]eversing the fragmentation of urban areas is an essential
step in ending severe racial and economic segregation."'32 The
solution-"The 'city' must be refined to reunify city and sub-
urb." 3-- though easy to say, has proved quite difficult to im-
plement. This reality is in no small way attributable to popular
bution Agreements, designed to produce 4,172 units of housing at a total
subsidy cost of $80,982,795 (additional subsidies may have come from
other sources) and an average subsidy of $19,411 per unit. Five munici-
palities accounted for 21 of the 39 contracts and 1,855 of the 4,172 hous-
ing units: Newark (6 contracts/732 units); Jersey City (5/194); New
Brunswick (4/406); Phillipsburg (3/373); and, Perth Amboy (3/150).
John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doc-
trine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665, 672-73 (1996).
131. See, e.g., INTERWOVEN DESTINIES: CITIES AND THE NATION (Henry G. Cisneros
ed. 1993); NEIL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COM-
PETITIVE WORLD (1993); Rusk, supra note 15; John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in
Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449,
473 (1993):
Although the federal government mounted significant efforts from the
1950s to the 1980s to promote regional and metropolitan governance,
primarily through financial incentives, those efforts were curtailed during
the 1980s not only because of opposition from President Reagan but also
because of the substantial shift of federal aid from places to persons and
because of rising budget deficits.
132. Rusk, supra note 15, at 85. Rusk is not without his critics. See, e.g., John P.
Blair et al., The Central City Elasticity Hypothesis: A Critical Appraisal of Rusk's
Theory of Urban Development, 62 J. AM. PLAN. AsS'N 345, 345 (1996) ("Rusk's recom-
mendations for restructuring metropolitan areas with more unified governance forms
such as consolidation, unified metropolitan government, limits on new incorporations,
or expanded annexation powers for central cities do not have strong empirical support
and should not be considered panaceas for central city decline.")
133. Rusk, supra note 15, at 85.
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resistance to metropolitan-wide solutions"M and to some very
real legal barriers, not the least of which is the Euclidean lega-
cy of local control of planning and zoning decision-making.
Finally, the last ten years have also witnessed a growing
unease with aesthetic-based regulation. While during the early
decades of this century, planners and urban designers wisely
abjured an overtly aesthetic strategy in the struggle for zoning's
legitimacy, 13 we have of late become much more familiar and
comfortable with a wide range of regulatory efforts to preserve
our built and unbuilt environment. Today, even advocates of
legal aesthetics concede that some excesses and missteps have
plagued this area. Professor Costonis observes that many judges
have embraced beauty as legal aesthetics' justification in
opinions that seldom acknowledge, let alone dispel, the
concerns advanced by their more cynical predecessors. Law-
makers, administrators, and citizen groups have been quick
to seize upon the modern judiciary's indiscriminate stance.
Countless aesthetics initiatives have streamed through the
floodgates the judges have unlocked. Many of these initia-
tives are superb, both in concept and administration. Others
have been neither, rendering legal aesthetics vulnerable to
the Dump Aesthetics critique.136
Particularly troubling are the developments in the areas of
historic preservation and adult use that imperil fundamental
First Amendment rights.
Emboldened by their victory in Penn Central, preservationists
have tightened the restrictions placed on places deemed archi-
tecturally, historically, or culturally significant. While in the
great majority of cases, public officials have proceeded in a
matter respectful of vested property and other rights, there are
134. See Kincaid, supra note 131, at 478-79:
[T]wentieth-century history clearly indicates that voters value local con-
trol and resist regulatory metropolitan regionalism. Supporters of state-
wide and regional land-use regulation and growth management, therefore,
will need to assure voters that they will have a voice in policymaking
and that decisionmaking institutions will be ultimately accountable to
local voters, not to a state bureaucracy established by the legislature
and/or a federal bureaucracy established by Congress.
135. See HAAR & WOLF, supra note 66, at 519-30.
136. Costonis, supra note 26, at 20.
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some discomfiting exceptions. The politically and culturally
charged struggle over the plans of St. Bartholomew's Episcopal
Church to replace its community building with a massive office
tower dragged out over a decade, ending with the Supreme
Court's refusal to overturn the Second Circuit's decision that
neither a taking nor a violation of free exercise protections had
occurred."3 7 The First Covenant Church of Seattle was more
successful in its challenge to landmark designation, although it
took more than a dozen years, two trips to the Washington
Supreme Court and a detour to the United States Supreme
Court to prevail on its free exercise claim."'
In United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadel-
phia,"'39 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Phila-
delphia Historical Commission, in designating the interior of
the historic Boyd Theater as historically and architecturally
significant, had overstepped its bounds:
The plain meaning of [the city] ordinance is that the interi-
or must be maintained physically (and not aesthetically) for
the express purpose of supporting the exterior of the
building. However, the Commission exceeded that authority
by designating the interior of the Boyd Theater. There is no
"clear and unmistakable" authority to designate the interior
of a building; therefore, the Commission possesses no such
power. By designating the interior of the Boyd Theater, the
Commission committed an error of law."
What makes this holding especially interesting is that it
appears in the court's reconsideration (and reversal) of its earli-
er "ruling that the designation of a building as historic is a
'taking' under our Constitution and requires just compensa-
tion.'"14'
137. See Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348
(2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991); Louis S. Hansen, St. Bart's Alliance
Pleases All; Conservancy Group Will Aid Restoration, Newsday, Jan. 20, 1995, at B15,
available in WESTLAW, NWSDAY database.
138. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash.
1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), holding reinstated en
banc, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1993); see also First United Methodist Church of Seattle
v. Hearing Examiner, 916 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1996) (designation of church as landmark
violated free exercise rights).
139. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
140. Id. at 622.
141. Id. at 614. See United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,
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The City of Boerne, Texas compounded the problem faced by
the United Artists court when it forbade the Saint Peter Catho-
lic Church, a nonlandmark located in the newly designated
Historic District, to enlarge its church building.' This land-
owner cited the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),"
which requires governments to justify substantial burdens on
free exercise of religion with a demonstration that the chal-
lenged regulation "is the least restrictive means of furthering
[a] compelling governmental interest."' The Fifth Circuit re-
versed a trial court holding that RFRA was unconstitution-
al,' and the case is currently on the docket of the United
States Supreme Court.' Similarly, in Keeler v. Mayor and
City Council of Cumberland,' the district court, in granting
summary judgment, held "that the City's refusal to grant the
Church [located in the Washington Street Historic District] a
Certificate of Appropriateness for the demolition of its monas-
tery impermissibly violates the Church's right to the free exer-
cise of religion protected by the First Amendment."'
Aesthetics-based regulations have recently raised concerns in
other First Amendment contexts. When, for example, officials in
Renton, Washington, sought to concentrate adult theaters rath-
er than disperse them throughout the city, the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment's free speech protections did not
obligate the city to tailor its regulatory scheme to the city's
specific circumstances:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experi-
ences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the
"detailed findings" summarized in the Washington Supreme
Court's Northend Cinema opinion, in enacting its adult
595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991).
142. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
293 (1996).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
144. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b)(2).
145. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp 355, 357-58 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
146. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (petition for writ of certio-
rari granted).
147. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996). See also Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928
F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996) (district court agreed with city that RFRA violated sepa-
ration of powers doctrine).
148. Keeler, 940 F. Supp. at 886-87.
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theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment does not
require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that al-
ready generated by other cities, so long as whatever evi-
dence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be rele-
vant to the problem that the city addresses. That was the
case here. Nor is our holding affected by the fact that Seat-
tle ultimately chose a different method of adult theater
zoning than that chosen by Renton, since Seattle's choice of
a different remedy to combat the secondary effects of adult
theaters does not call into question either Seattle's identifi-
cation of those secondary effects or the relevance of Seattle's
experience to Renton.'49
This deference resembles that found in the typical Euclidean
case, one that involves no serious allegation that the
landowner's fundamental rights have been violated. 50
More recently, the Supreme Court, troubled by a Missouri
city's widespread regulation of residential signs, reacted with a
finding protective of a landowner's free speech rights. In City of
Ladue v. Gilleo,"' the city's aesthetic goals were apparent in
the sign ordinance's "Declaration of Findings, Policies, Interests,
and Purposes," in which regulators complained that the
proliferation of an unlimited number of signs in private,
residential, commercial, industrial, and public areas of the
City of Ladue would create ugliness, visual blight and clut-
ter, tarnish the natural beauty of the landscape as well as
the residential and commercial architecture, impair property
values, substantially impinge upon the privacy and special
ambience of the community, and may cause safety and
traffic hazards to motorists, pedestrians, and children[.] 52
Margaret P. Gilleo violated the sign ordinance by posting a sign
in a second-story window of her house; the offending dis-
149. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). See also
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (licensing scheme for "sexually
oriented businesses" constituted unconstitutional prior restraint lacking adequate pro-
cedural safeguards).
150. See Wolf, supra note 8, at 12.
151. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
152. Id. at 2041 (quoting declaration) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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play-measuring eight-and-one-half inches by eleven inch-
es-read, "For Peace in the Gulf."'53
The Ladue Court, treading carefully on already unsteady
jurisprudential terrain,1" declared that the city had over-
stepped the bounds set by the First Amendment. While the
Justices conceded the validity of Ladue's "interest in minimizing
visual clutter,"'55 they were seriously troubled that the city
"almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communica-
tion that is both unique and important. It has totally foreclosed
that medium to political, religious, or personal messages."'56
The Court could not have been surprised that cities such as
Ladue have would embarked on such zealous campaigns in the
name of beauty, given the imprimatur the Justices have placed
on a wide range of aesthetic-based regulation.'57
The eighth decade of Euclidean zoning poses considerable
challenges for advocates of locally based planning and zoning.
The bright promise of ten short years ago-when post-Euclidean
devices and inclusionary zoning, like the incentive-based, flexi-
ble environmental regulations with which they had so much in
common, earned the acceptance of a cautious, yet respectful,
judiciary-has dimmed significantly, to such an extent that
legislators, judges, and commentators have called for some
fundamental restructuring of the foundations underlying the
Euclid text and, in turn, our attitudes toward regulation of the
use and enjoyment of land.
III. To THE HEART OF EUCLID: ELEMENTAL CHALLENGES
In 1986, even after decades of modification, innovation, and
judicial gloss, three "intrinsic elements . . . withstood the chal-
153. Id. at 2040.
154. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Limnark Assoc., Inc. v.
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
155. Ladue, 114 S. Ct. at 2044-45.
156. Id. at 2045.
157. See, e.g. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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lenges of time, theory, and practice." "First," I observed a de-
cade ago,
the Court prescribed a flexible approach in the legislative
implementation and judicial review of public land use plan-
ning devices. Second, the Court endorsed careful, expert-
based planning, eschewing the haphazard vagaries of the
market. Third, the Court approved the transfer, from indi-
vidual to collective ownership, of development rights above
a level often labeled "reasonable return.""
Today, all three of these elements are under attack, in the
courthouse, on the floor of the legislature, and in the pages of
legal and popular journals. If any one of these at-risk elements
falls, then we will know that the twilight noted in the title is
upon us.
A. Flexibility?
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws
and regulations, must find their justification in some aspect
of the police power, asserted for the public welfare. The line
which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegiti-
mate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimi-
tation. It varies with circumstances and conditions. A regu-
latory zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid as
applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as ap-
plied to rural communities .... [T]he question whether the
power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a partic-
ular kind or for a particular use, like the question whether
a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by
an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing
considered apart, but by considering it in connection with
the circumstances and the locality.1 59
With these words, Justice Sutherland, on behalf of the Euclid
majority, signaled that the validity of governmental regulations
affecting the use of land would not be determined in a detached
manner or through a categorical method, but in a context that
158. Wolf, supra note 9, at 269.
159. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
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considered and balanced competing public and private demands.
Three recent jurisprudential developments challenge directly
this Euclidean approach.
First, the use of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine16
in Nollan and Dolan threatens the very flexible, post-Euclidean,
planning and zoning devices-such as conditional rezoning,
transferable development rights, inclusionary zoning discussed
previously"6 --that employ incentives to stimulate positive pri-
vate-sector activities. Sadly, because government officials at all
levels must now be extremely cautious when allowing devel-
opment subject to conditions, the wisest route for regulators
might be to "just say no" to private sector actors.
Second, the categorical approach introduced by Justice Scalia
in Lucas,62 unlike the ad hoc, balancing approach of Penn
Central," is an attempt to decide regulatory takings chal-
lenges with little regard for "circumstances and the locali-
ty."' If it can be demonstrated that a total deprivation of
value has been occasioned by governmental activity, only
nuisance-like circumstances are relevant to the holding."
While some may console themselves with the fact that, for
now, the set of cases in which total takings occur is quite
minuscule, a third development--conceptual severance"'-
160. According to the Dolan Court, under the doctrine "the government may not
require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just com-
pensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary
benefit conferred by the government where the property sought has little or no rela-
tionship to the benefit." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (citing
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968)). See also Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1988); Wolf, supra note 8, at 15, 19-20.
161. See supra Part I.
162. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-19 (1992);
Wolf, supra note 36, at 479-80.
163. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
164. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
165. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-31; Wolf, supra note 36, at 479-80.
166. See Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988) (defining concep-
tual severance as "delineating a property interest consisting of just what the govern-
ment action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular
whole thing has been permanently taken.").
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threatens to increase its size considerably. To this point, the
idea that the denominator in the regulatory takings equipment
should be reduced to reflect the specific reach of the regulation
at issue, rather than the "parcel as a whole,"'67 has been con-
fined to dissents and dicta by the Justices.'68 Other federal
jurists have been more daring, however, 69 and it appears like-
ly that sometime soon that the Supreme Court will have anoth-
er opportunity to decide whether to increase considerably the
universe of total deprivation cases.70
B. Deference to Experts?
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the
hands of commissions and experts, and the results of their
investigations have been set forth in comprehensive reports.
These reports which bear every evidence of painstaking
consideration, concur in the view that the segregation of
residential, business and industrial buildings will make it
easier to provide fire apparatus suitable for the character
and intensity of the development in each section; that it
will increase the safety and security of home life, greatly
tend to prevent street accidents, especially to children, by
reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residential
sections, decrease noise and other conditions which produce
or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more favorable
environment in which to rear children, etc....
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate
the wisdom or sound policy in all respects of those restric-
tions which we have indicated as pertinent to the inquiry,
at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us
167. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
168. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7; (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 518-20 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 143. See also Wolf, supra note 8, at 63-64.
169. See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (land-
owner denied permit to fill wetlands entitled to compensation for taking), affd, 28
F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
170. There are two cases currently on the Supreme Court's docket that raise tak-
ings questions. See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (involving ripeness determination for
landowner's challenge of restrictions placed on parcel located in 'stream environment
zone"); Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1874
(1996) (involving federal law limiting descent and devise of minor fractional interests
in Native American lands).
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from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 7'
Thus did the Court establish a pattern of deference to ex-
perts in the area of land use regulation; over the past few de-
cades, support for that pattern has eroded significantly. For
example, President Ronald Reagan's Commission on Housing, of
which antizoning advocate Bernard Siegan was an influential
member, suggested the following substitute for the "fairly de-
batable"72 test:
To protect property rights and to increase the production
of housing and lower its cost, all State and local legisla-
tures should enact legislation providing that no zoning
regulations denying or limiting the development of housing
should be deemed valid unless their existence or adoption is
necessary to achieve a vital and pressing governmental in-
terest. In litigation, the governmental body seeking to main-
tain or impose the regulation should bear the burden for
proving it complies with the foregoing standard.
Recent critics of the Euclid Court's indulgent standard are
not confined to those commentators of libertarian ilk who object
to a wide range of land-use regulation.' 4  Professors
Mandelker and Tarlock, outspoken advocates of responsible
171. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Real Estate Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
172. "If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly de-
batable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
173. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUS., THE REPORT OF THE PRESDENT'S COMMISSION
ON HOUSING 200 (1982). The Commission directly challenged the Court's 1926 holding:
ETihe Commission believes the Euclid doctrine should be reexamined. The
Commission recommends that the Attorney General seek an appropriate
case in which to request review of the Euclid doctrine in the context of
modem land-use issues and the due process protections afforded other
property rights in the 50 years since Euclid was decided.
Id. at 202.
174. See, e.g., Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Changing
the Presumption of Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy," 44 ARK. L.
REV. 65 (1991); Robert B. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-
Use Law: A Substitute For Analysis, a Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 301 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, Protecting Vital and Pressing
Governmental Interests-A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling Act, 30 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 19 (1986); Bernard Siegan, Non-Zoning is the Best Zoning, 31
CAL. W. L. REV. 127 (1994).
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land-use and environmental controls,175 have identified the
hard choices faced by courts in zoning cases:
A deferential standard satisfies separation of power con-
cerns by ensuring that elected bodies discharge their consti-
tutional and legislative functions. But, deferential review,
usually the substitution of a more coherent and elegant
rationale for the decision, leaves too many persons at risk
from arbitrariness. Intrusive review puts courts on the
shoals of value substitution. There are no transcendent
zoning values that could form the basis for a rights-based
approach to judicial control of zoning. 76
Mandelker and Tarlock summarize four "types of cases in which
presumption-shifting has become common 7 7: "Constitutional
Rights and Suspect Classification Cases," 78 and cases involv-
ing "Zoning Barriers to Affordable Housing,"79 "Zoning Barri-
ers to Nontraditional Families and Dwellings,"80 and "Mal-
function in the Zoning Process."'8' While, in these situations,
it is not uncommon to find courts questioning the motives and
methods of land-use regulators, we have not yet reached the
stage at which the right to own and use private property is
viewed as fundamental under the Constitution, meaning that
all controls of the use and enjoyment of land would be, under
175. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution:
Can it Be Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480 (1989) ("The hope is that this pro-
gram will encourage state and local government experimentation with land use con-
trols that are necessary to resolve the nonpoint pollution problem.'); Tarlock, supra
note 97, at 560 ("Biodiversity protection is not a Romantic effort to create the illusion
of a prior Eden, but is a highly rational effort to apply modem science to prevent
further harmful reductions in high quality habitats and the species that they sup-
port.").
176. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitu-
tionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1, 10 (1992).
177. Id. at 11.
178. Id. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live
entertainment ban violated First Amendment free speech protections).
179. Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 176, at 14. See, e.g., Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 1), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
180. Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 176, at 15. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Euclidean deference inappropriate for zoning provision
defining families too narrowly).
181. Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 176, at 16. See, e.g., Fritts v. City of
Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961) (city failed to carry its burden to justify change
in rezoning case).
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due process and equal protection analysis, subject to elevated
judicial scrutiny.'82
There are, of course, signs that some Supreme Court Justices
are moving in the direction of fundamentality. The initial
stirrings took place in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Nollan, particularly in its insistence that the standards applied
in regulatory takings challenges were different from those used
when other claims were brought against the government:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the
same as those applied to due process or equal protection
claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the tak-
ings field have generally been quite different. We have
required that the regulation "substantially advance" the
"legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved, not that
"the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective." .. . ITihere is
no reason to believe (and the language of our cases gives
some reason to disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of
property is at issue the standards for takings challenges,
due process challenges, and equal protection challenges are
identical; any more than there is any reason to believe that
so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the standards
for due process challenges, equal protection challenges, and
First Amendment challenges are identical."
The Court's use of the word "substantial" is anachronistic, for it
derives from a case, Euclid,'" that was decided decades before
182. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITuTIONAL LAW 606 (4th ed.
1991).
183. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. at 836 n.3 (quoting Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
184. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1927):
If these reasons, thus summarized, do not demonstrate the wisdom or
sound policy in all respects of those restrictions which we have indicated
as pertinent to the inquiry, at least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to
preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.
Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Court in Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, actually
cites Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), for the proposition that
"It]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests." In the Nectow
opinion, 277 U.S. 187-88, however, Justice Sutherland cites Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395,
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the current usage for cases involving heightened scrutiny."
Still, this part of Justice Scalia's opinion was dictum, as the
condition imposed by the California Coastal Commission on the
beachfront landowners did not meet "even the most untailored
standards."'
Of much greater import than this subtle rhetorical shift is
the Court's decision in Dolan to "plac[e] the burden on the city
to justify the required dedication" of property for a public
greenway and pedestrian/bicycle pathway."7 By transferring to
the public actor the responsibility of justifying its actions, the
Justices have sent the clearest signal yet of their willingness to
abandon the Euclidean notion that, except in cases involving
specially protected rights or vulnerable populations, private
property owners carry the burden of demonstrating arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable conduct by public regulators.
Regretfully, there are indications that these changes are
related to a growing judicial skepticism regarding the motives
and abilities of government officials. In Nollan, the Court
equates the Coastal Commission's conditional permitting system
with "'an out-and-out plan of extortion."" Then, during the
oral argument in Dolan, Justice Scalia offered the following
for the "substantial relation" language. In Euclid itself, 272 U.S. at 396, Sutherland
had identified Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1917),
and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905) as sources for the test. The
Jacobson Court in turn, 197 U.S. at 31, includes as its oldest authority Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) ("If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been
enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no
real or substantial relation to those objects .. . ."). See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 183, at 573-91 (discussing the evolution of the Supreme Court's standards
of review).
185. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 184, at 579 ("The intermediate standard of
review has been formally adopted for gender and illegitimacy cases .... Under the
intermediate standard of review, the classification must have a substantial relation-
ship to an important interest of government.").
186. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. The Commission claimed that the condition was
"reasonably related to the public need or burden that the Nollans' new house creates
or to which it contributes." Id. This would not be the first time that the Court would
fault a land-use regulator for failing to have a reasonable basis for its actions. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (equal protection
violation for city's requirement that group home for mentally retarded secure special
use permit).
187. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 n.8 (1994).
188. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d
12, 14-15 (1981)).
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hypothetical set of facts: "[S]uppose the City is worried about
urban congestion and pollution and someone who has a factory
wants to... expand it infinitesimally, just a very little bit.
Can the State require, as a condition of that permit, a million-
dollar contribution to the City, which would go to ... pollution
reduction?"'8 9 These are not the words of a jurist who, in the
context of environmental and land-use regulation, feels comfort-
able with the findings and actions of government experts. As
the next session indicates, that skepticism is shared by federal
and state legislators as well.
C. Reasonable Return
The bill alleges that the tract of land in question is vacant
and has been held for years for the purpose of selling and
developing it for industrial uses, for which it is especially
adapted, being immediately in the path or progressive in-
dustrial development; that for such uses it has a market
value of about $10,000 per acre, but if the use be limited to
residential purposes the market value is not in excess of
$2,500 per acre; that the first 200 feet of the parcel back
from Euclid avenue, if unrestricted in respect of use, has a
value of $150 per front foot, but if limited to residential
uses, and ordinary mercantile business be excluded there-
from, its value is not in excess of $50 per front foot.
It is specifically averred that the ordinance attempts to
restrict and control the lawful uses of appellee's land, so as
to confiscate and destroy a great part of its value; that it is
being enforced in accordance with its terms; that prospec-
tive buyers of land for industrial, commercial, and residen-
tial uses in the metropolitan district of Cleveland are de-
terred from buying any part of this land because of the
existence of the ordinance and the necessity thereby en-
tailed of conducting burdensome and expensive litigation in
order to vindicate the right to use the land for lawful and
legitimate purposes; that the ordinance constitutes a cloud
upon the land, reduces and destroys its value, and has the
effect of diverting the normal industrial, commercial, and
189. Official Transcript of Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United
States at 45, Dolan (No. 93-518).
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residential development thereof to other and less favorable
locations.'
Perhaps the most significant legacy of Euclid is the notion
that government regulation that significantly reduces the value
of real property is not necessarily invalid. Though Euclid tech-
nically is not a regulatory takings case,"' courts in takings
cases have consistently followed Justice Sutherland's lead in
allowing significant deprivations in the name of the public in-
terest,".. even when, as in Ambler Realty's challenge, the
landowner asserts that the regulation "attempts to restrict and
control the lawful uses of appellee's land, so as to confiscate
and destroy a great part of its value.""' These subsequent
cases have established that, so long as the regulation allows
the landowner to maintain a "reasonable beneficial use,"" an
"economically viable use,"" or a "reasonable rate of
return," "' even a significant reduction in value will survive
judicial review.
The same cannot be said for legislative review, at least ac-
cording to the growing number of lawmakers, state and federal,
who over the past decade have responded to the growing
property rights movement by promoting takings statutes de-
signed to trigger procedural and substantive relief for landown-
ers whose property is somewhat, though not totally, reduced in
value."' Consider, for example, this provision from S. 605, the
190. Euclid, 272 U.S. 384-85.
191. See id. at 384 ("The ordinance is assailed on the grounds that it is in deroga-
tion of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution in that it
deprives appellee of liberty and property without due process of law and denies it the
equal protection of the law . . ").
192. See Wolf, supra note 8, at 63 n.305 (citing cases involving significant depri-
vations).
193. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
194. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. United States, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
195. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
196. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
197. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West 1996):
When a specific action of a governmental entity has inordinately
burdened an existing use of real property or a vested right to a specific
use of real property, the property owner of that real property is entitled
to relief, which may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair
market value of the real property caused by the action of government, as
provided in this section.
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"Omnibus Property Rights Act of Act of 1995,"' a proposal
that garnered strong support from leading Republicans in the
104th Congress:99
No agency or State agency, shall take private property
except for public use and with just compensation to the
property owner. A property owner shall receive just compen-
sation if-
(1) As a consequence of an action of any agency, or State
agency, private property (whether all or in part) has been
physically invaded or taken for public use without the con-
sent of the owner; and...
(D) such action diminishes the fair market value of the
affected portion of the property which is the subject of the
action by 33 percent or more with respect to the value
immediately prior to the governmental action; .... "o
There is certainly no guarantee that, should a proposal of this
sort emerge from Congress with the approval (or over the objec-
tions of) the President, lawmakers and regulators would have
an easier time than the courts in drawing the line between
compensable and "free" regulations.' Notwithstanding these
See also John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face of Un-
certainty, 26 URB. LAW. 327 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Proper-
ty Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAhl ENvTL. L.J. 409 (1995); Richard Miniter, You Just
Can't Take it Anymore: America's Property Rights Movement, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
POL Y REV., Fall 1994, at 40; Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Where It Stands
and What Is Next, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 509 (1996); Charles Tiefer, Controlling Federal
Agencies by Claims on Their Appropriations? The Takings Bill and the Power of the
Purse, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 501 (1996); Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth
Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FoRDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 637 (1995).
198. S. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
199. The lead sponsor was Senator Bob Dole (R.-Ks.). Joining the Republican presi-
dential nominee were Senators Hatch, Lott, Gramm, and Thurmond, among several
others.
200. S. 605, § 204(a). See also H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1995):
The Federal Government shall compensate an owner of property whose
use of any portion of that property has been limited by an agency action,
under a specified regulatory law, that diminishes the fair market value of
that portion by 20 percent or more. The amount of the compensation
shall equal the diminution in value that resulted from the agency action.
If the diminution in value of a portion of that property is greater than
50 percent, at the option of the owner, the Federal Government shall buy
that portion of the property for its fair market value.
201. See Sax, supra note 197, at 515:
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:961
real practical difficulties, the very promulgation of a new tak-
ings threshold would signal a departure from the Euclidean
"reasonableness" standard that allowed for, and even encour-
aged, decades of creative and responsive land-use and environ-
mental regulation.
IV. EUCLID AT TWILIGHT: FOLLOWING FOUR LODESTARS
Given these significant challenges to Euclid's central ele-
ments, we should prepare now for the time that land-use and
environmental regulation are cut loose from their jurispruden-
tial moorings. Each of the four guest contributors to this Allen
Chair Symposium offers an important lesson for this critical
twilight period. Defenders and opponents of traditional com-
mand-and-control and incentive-based regulatory systems would
benefit greatly from their instruction.
A. Lesson One: Rekindle the Common-Law Light
For years, Professor James Krier has pursued the gremlin
that threatens to enervate and disable all expert-based, admin-
istrative, environmental regulation-risk assessment."' In one
of his more recent ruminations on the subject, The End of the
World News, Professor Krier, with the deft humor that often ac-
companies and complements his keenest insights, offers little
hope for a quick fix:
why do proponents of these bills believe that Congress is likely to do a
better job in articulating the standard for fairness to property owners in
these bills than the courts have done in nearly 150 years of struggling
with the question? This is, I think, the central dilemma on which they
are caught. They are unprepared to say that they think the Supreme
Court is all mixed up and does not know what it's doing. And so they
say, "we want to avoid the problems of litigation," but once pressed on
that point they don't seem to be able to show a way to avoid the prob-
lems of litigation. They face the same problems of definition with which
the Supreme Court has struggled, and they are caught up in the same
inability to come up with a simple one-dimensional answer.
202. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990); James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 851 (1994) (hereinafter End of the World); James E. Krier, Round
Table Discussion: Science, Environment, and the Law, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 356 (1994);
James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Uneasy Case for Technological Optimism,
84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
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We could proceed to make policy by the equivalent of a coin
flip, on the principle of insufficient reason, but it seems
bizarre to let random luck decide our destiny (which of
itself provides a sufficient reason to do otherwise). We could
turn to mystery and ritual, as did our distant ances-
tors-could if we had not already. The primitives had sha-
mans, which we call risk assessors; they had totems, and
we have science, progress, and technological wonders; they
had taboos, but so do we; and despite all of these we still
have our modem predicament. 3
Professor Krier's current offering shares little of the pessimism
evident in this excerpt.
Indeed, Professor Krier's current exploration of self-help, of
which Capture and Counteraction: Self-Help by Environmental
Zealots"' is part, is invigorating because it reminds us that
even in the age of internet access to gigabytes of statutes and
regulations, there is much in the encrustations of judge-made
law that is worth our careful and respectful study. It is easy to
admire the way in which Professor Krier makes that bugaboo of
first-year property courses-Pierson v. Post ---relevant to a
Greenpeace, post-Coasean world: "In a state of abun-
dance-whether abundant wildlife, groundwater, oil, gas, or any
other fugitive resource-the balance of costs and benefits makes
exploitation sensible, and the rule of capture as fashioned by
the courts promoted exactly that."2 5
The example set by Krier's article is especially apt today,
when our struggle to make environmental and land-use reg-
ulation meet competing public and private demands is
increasingly focused on the latest scientifically informed reg-
ulatory scheme. The language of environmental lawyers is
peppered with acronyms-NEPA, °7  RCRA,0 8  FIFRA,0 9
BAT,210 PRP,21' FONSI,2' and so many others-that sym-
203. Krier, End of the World, supra note 203, at 865 (footnote omitted).
204. 30 U. RicH. L. REv. 1039 (1996).
205. 3 Cal. Re. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
206. Krier, supra note 203, at 1051 (citation omitted).
207. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
208. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1994).
209. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994).
210. WILLni H. RODGERS, JR., ENviRONMENTAL LAW 360-61 (2d ed., 1994) (dis-
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bolize our fixation with regulations that are piled upon layers
of other regulations, all balancing precariously on their statuto-
ry foundations. We are too far removed from the common-sense,
experience-based principles that inform the best of our common-
law system. After all, for hundreds of years judges have been
called upon to reconcile discordant land-uses and to protect the
community from serious harm. 13
In anticipation of the shift away from Euclidean deference to
regulators, wedshould be searching now for jurisprudential al-
ternatives to reliance on a haphazard and unforgiving market.
Justice Scalia's environmentally unfriendly opinion in Lucas has
already engendered a spate of legal research devoted to the
exploration of the nuisance origins of modern environmental
and planning schemes.214 We need to strengthen that data-
base, not as a substitute, but as a complement to, and, yes, cor-
rection for, modern regulation.
B. Lesson Two: Remember the Power of Private Property Rights
Rhetoric is easily translated into power in a society devoted
to the rule of law. Over the past few years, property rights
activists have cast supporters of regulation as anti-property,
even anti-American. For example, congressional supporters of
the Private Property Owners Bill of Rights," are responsible
for the following collection of aspersions:
cussing Best Available Technology in Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1994)).
211. Id. at 767-83 (discussing Potentially Responsible Parties in context of
Superfund liability, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994)).
212. Id. at 870 (discussing Finding of No Significant Impact which eliminates need
to file Environmental Impact Statement under National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994).
213. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 66, at 89-135. For a provocative argu-
ment in favor of common-law resolution of environmental issues, see J.B. Ruhl, Com-
plexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up
Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUE L.J. 851
(1996).
214. See, e.g., Patricia A. Hageman, Fifth Amendment Takings Issues Raised by
Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 375 (1994);
Hart, supra note 29; Wolf, supra note 8.
215. H.R. 3875, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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Just as the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc are
discovering the critical need for private property, there are
those in this country who in the name of environmental
protection would seek to destroy the right to use your own
land.2 16
Radical environmentalists disagree with the Founding Fa-
thers who wrote and ratified the Constitution, arguing that
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), federal wetlands regula-
tions and other environmental protection measures should
supersede the Constitution.21
We have new tyrants depriving us of our inalienable rights
of life, liberty, and property-King George has been re-
placed by bureaucrats and kangaroo rats.1 '
It should not be surprising, given the current jurisprudential
rules of the game, that the targets of these attacks have spent
an inordinate amount of time and energy trying to deflate and
devalue the notion of fundamental private property rights. Still,
if we are to move toward meaningful resolution of the problems
plaguing modern environmental and land-use regulation, we
must move beyond the kind of damaging discourse represented
by the quotations above.
There is probably no more energetic, enthusiastic, and dili-
gent voice in defense of private property rights than Judge
Loren Smith, whose contribution to this collection is titled Life,
Liberty & Whose Property?" Unlike his more intemperate
counterparts in the legislative branch, Judge Smith speaks of a
"legal system [that has become] insensitive to the rights associ-
ated with property or economic liberty,"" ° and ascribes that
"insensitivity" not to unpatriotism or extremism, but to "[t]he
American progressive movement, one of the first political ex-
pressions of ... awe of science and rational central planning,
216. 140 Cong. Rec. E233 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Statement of Rep. Don Young) (quoted
in Wolf, supra note 195, at 651.
217. 140 Cong. Rec. S2639 (Feb. 22, 1994) (Statement of Sen. Richard Shelby)
(quoted in Wolf, supra note 197, at 653).
218. 140 Cong. Rec. E224 (Feb. 23, 1994) (Statement of Rep. Jack Fields) (quoted
in Wolf, supra note 197, at 653).
219. 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055 (1996).
220. Id. at 1056.
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[that] saw individual rights and the Constitution as a barrier to
needed progressive and scientific social reform."22'
From his bench at the United States Court of Federal
Claims, Judge Smith has sent a clear message to federal law-
makers and regulators that they must be mindful of vested
property rights when instituting new programs. Indeed, Judge
Smith's opinions in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States21
and Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,2 3 rescued private
property owners from new regulatory regimes that did not in-
clude the kind of nonconforming use provisions routinely includ-
ed in local zoning codes.2
Judge Smith's writings, within and outside the case report-
ers, remind us of the power of the notion of vested rights, and
of the difficulties our legal system encounters in the attempt to
determine just exactly when and how vesting occurs.2 1 Unfor-
tunately, because of the way in which federal takings law has
221. Id. at 1058.
222. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), affd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (landowner denied
permit to fill wetlands entitled to compensation for taking).
223. 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), affd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 406 (1991) (taking of property owners' coal interests effected through enactment
of Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.)).
224. See, e.g., HAAR & WOLF, supra note 66, at 290-308 (materials on nonconform-
ing uses).
In Loveladies Harbor, the land at issue was purchased in 1956. By May
5, 1982, 199 acres had been improved by landfill, where necessary, and
by the construction of homes. Most of these acres had been sold to the
general public. Development of the remaining 51 acres was prevented by
the enactment of certain state and federal statutes regulating wetlands.
21 Cl. Ct. at 153.
In Whitney Benefits, Judge Smith noted:
SMCRA's proposed grandfather clause specifically would have let plain-
tiffs mine Whitney coal because their property was enumerated in the
list of properties the clause was intended to cover. Unfortunately for
plaintiffs, the grandfather clause was removed before the statute was
enacted to prevent the mining of the enumerated properties. Since the
grandfather clause was intended to cover Whitney, and since it was re-
moved in order to prevent the mining of Whitney, this court logically
must find that SMCRA was intended to affect Whitney coal.
18 Cl. Ct. at 407.
225. For a particularly puzzling example, see Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl.
147 (1996), and the fine student note included in this symposium, Danielle Stager,
Note, Takings in the Court of Federal Claims: Does the Court Make Takings Policy in
Hage?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 1183 (1996).
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evolved, vesting has quite negative connotations for defenders of
land-use and environmental regulation. We should recall Wil-
lard Hurst's notion that in the nineteenth-century American
polity, contrary to laissez-faire myth-making, "two working prin-
ciples" operated:
(1) The legal order should protect and promote the release
of individual creative energy to the greatest extent compati-
ble with the broad sharing of opportunity for such expres-
sion. In pursuit of this end, law might be used both (a) to
secure a man a chance to be let alone, free of arbitrary
public or private interference, while he showed what he
could do, and (b) to provide instruments or procedures to
lend the support of the organized community to the effect-
ing of man's creative talents, even where this involved us-
ing the law's compulsion to enforce individual ar-
rangements. (2) The legal order should mobilize the resourc-
es of the community to help shape an environment which
would give men more liberty by increasing the practical
range of choices open to them and minimizing the limiting
force of circumstances. 26
In other words, property rights and government regulation are
not natural enemies. The challenge for the coming decades is to
construct a new paradigm that somehow accommodates the
individual need "to be let alone" with the environmentalists'
mantra that "everything is connected to everything else."227
Judge Smith's careful, moderate tone contrasts with the harsh,
alarmist rhetoric, from either corner, that only serves to
distract us from tackling the difficult task of finding that
paradigm.
226. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 6 (1956).
227. BARRY COmMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND TECHNOLOGY 33
(1971) (labeling this "the first law of ecology").
See also Joseph L. Sax, The Constitutional Dimensions of Property: A Debate, 26
Loy. L-.A L. REv. 23 (1992). Professor Sax writes:
The ecological truism that everything is connected to everything else may
be the most profound challenge ever presented to established notions of
property. The reason is that every traditional theory of property assumes
rights within a bounded domain, where one can use, enjoy, profit and
exclude, but not adversely affect others within their separate domains.
Id. at 32.
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C. Lesson Three: Respect the Promise of Planning
Beginning with his work in the nascent Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Professor Charles Haar has ex-
plored the potential of the modern public-private partnership,
seeking to enlist the creative drive and energy of the market in
the cause of economic development and community revitaliza-
tion.22 Though he has never been hesitant to point out the
negative potential of local land-use controls,2" in his contribu-
tion to this collection, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A
Paradigm Shift?,"0 Professor Haar assures us that there is
synthesis and progress in the history of zoning and planning.
We can share his optimism that public and private can be cre-
ative partners-"My guess is that, though far short of a revolu-
tionary break such as repeal, society is ready to move the equi-
librium further than in the past, most particularly against the
prevailing legal constraint of a separation between the public
and private worlds"2"'-and that our system is flexible enough
to accommodate technological, economic, and ideological
shifts---"Essentially, . .. the stability of land-use controls is the
striking factor-the system's ability to adapt to startlingly new
transportation technologies, changes in financing and the flow
of capital, even transformations of family values."" 2
Professor Haar, who in large part shaped the contours of
land-use planning as a legal discipline, has been an active wit-
ness to the cycles of public and private ascendancy in post-
World War II America. His latest offering convinces us that
comprehensive land-use planning resonates with the American
ethos:
228. See Lance M. Liebman & Michael Allan Wolf, Essays Honoring Charles M.
Haar: Introduction, 50 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1 (1996).
229. See Haar, supra note 100, and the insightful student-authored review included
in this symposium, Abigail T. Baker, Book Note, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (re-
viewing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES (1996)).
230. 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011 (1996).
231. Id. at 1031.
232. Id. at 1014-15.
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Like American society, zoning is profoundly middle-class
and liberal in basic orientation toward rights and deeply
Lockean in character. On the other hand, it seeks to absorb
contending viewpoints of the existence of a public interest
without shaking the core belief system. Consequently, land-
use controls embody on a local scale, and in a physical
sense, the national ambivalence and ambiguity. In adoption,
by not bringing conflicts out in the open, but seemingly
adopting all views at one and the same time, the ordi-
nances are again typically American in the desire not to
highlight conflict or probe the darker side. 3
It is undeniable that centralized, uniform regulation offers sig-
nificant benefits in the environmental arena. Nonetheless, Pro-
fessor Haar's article prompts the nagging thought that federal
environmental law-removed as it is from the local community
in the drafting, promulgation, and enforcement stages-suffers
from the absence of this kind of compatibility.
D. Lesson Four: Reconsider the Development! Conservation
Dichotomy
Dean William McDonough is a leading environmentalist
thinker and actor whose livelihood and artistic expression are
intimately tied to private-sector, real property development. His
career demonstrates that "sustainable development" and "envi-
ronmental design" are neither oxymoronic nor unattainable
concepts.2" Those of us who make our living by cautioning
others can admire his willingness to dare, "to play at the edge
of progress.""
233. Id. at 1020.
234. For example, Dean McDonough has recently designed healthful and environ-
mentally friendly offices for the Heinz family in Pittsburgh, see William A.
McDonough, Dialogue on Design, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1071, 1071-72 n.4, and an ener-
gy efficient Wal-Mart with an on-site recycling center in Lawrence, Kansas. See id. at
1072 n.5. See also WILAAI MCDONOUGH + PARTNERS, THE HANNOVER PRINCI-
PLES--DESIGN FOR SUsTAINABiLrrY (1995) (on file with the University of Richmond
Law Review); William McDonough, Design, Ecology, Ethics, and the Making of Things,
Sermon at the Cathedral of St. John Divine (Feb. 7, 1993), in WILLIAM McDONOUGH
+ PARTNERS-SELECTED ARTICLES (on file with the University of Richmond Law Re-
view).
235. Id. at 1072.
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Dean McDonough offers us a peek over the horizon into the
next century, where, perhaps, the goal of the ensuing genera-
tion of regulation will be to create a regime that accentuates
not the negative-the prevention of harmful spillovers and
externalities-but the positive-the fostering of sustainable
solutions. "[B]ecause design is the first signal of human inten-
tion," he tells us, "it is a highly positive activity, not a reaction
based on guilt. For attorneys, especially, it is an exciting notion
that we could be designing a regulatory matrix that enhances
creativity in a positive direction ....,6
The most important lesson we can glean from Dean
McDonough's life and words may well be the irrelevance of law
in the overall struggle to, with all due respect to nature, build
a more liveable world. From his perspective outside the confines
of the law, he imagines that
[r]egulation is the first signal of the failure of design ....
It says that we haven't figured out how to do something
safely, so now we have to figure out to regulate it. I'm
much more interested in a design agenda that says, "Don't
create the problem, don't need the regulation." Eliminate
regulations for all time, not just for this generation, and not
just so that this generation can pollute and kill, but so that
all generations can be free of that kind of what Jefferson
would probably characterize as remote tyranny."
Such a strategy may lead to the removal of some valuable pro-
fessional turf from attorneys and law schools. Still, with our
knowledge, and in some cases mastery, of the often frustrating
and puzzling current legal regime, lawyers would be valuable
partners in McDonough-inspired undertakings to obviate the
context for more regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Ten years ago, I noted that "[a] 60-year anniversary is an
appropriate time to take an accounting of Euclid and its lega-
236. Id. at 1074.
237. Id. at 1079.
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cy."M The case's seventieth birthday seems a more somber
occasion. We should not waste what is perhaps our last oppor-
tunity for reflection now that legislative, judicial, and theoreti-
cal evidence abounds that twilight has indeed fallen upon the
Euclidean plain. The four lessons-to rekindle the common-law
light, remember the power of private property rights, respect
the promise of planning, and reconsider the development/con-
servation dichotomy-presented in greater detail in the contri-
butions that follow, comprise lodestars to light the way during
this murky period in the evolution of American land-use and
environmental regulation. With their guidance, in forms and
forums about which we can now only speculate, we will be
better equipped for the coming struggles at last to achieve (or
at least to approach) that elusive balance of private right and
public need.
238. Wolf, supra note 9, at 271.
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